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Out of the Shadows, Into the Light:
Preventing Workplace Discrimination
Against Medical Marijuana Users
By ELIZABETH HURWITZ*
Introduction
JANE SMITH1 is an Iraq War veteran. After returning home from her
last tour of duty, she began to experience severe psychological and
emotional trauma. Months later she was diagnosed with severe depres-
sion and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of her
service. After several years of therapy and a wide array of ever-chang-
ing prescription medications her doctor recommended that she try
medical marijuana to help ease the depression, anxiety, and insomnia
related to her disorder. Medical marijuana has worked for Jane, giving
her the ability to function, socialize, and work like a person without
PTSD. Now able to hold a job, she faces discrimination in the form of
pre-employment drug testing which uncovers her marijuana use. Al-
though that use has been decriminalized under California state law,
there have been no laws preventing employment discrimination based
on use of medical marijuana or one’s status as a qualified patient. The
fact that marijuana remains a Schedule I narcotic under the federal
Controlled Substances Act makes it more difficult to have employers
voluntarily offer an accommodation to pre-employment drug testing
for qualified patient employees.2 Jane and the thousands of other
qualified patients in California face a difficult choice: forego the legal
medication to manage their symptoms or hold a job in order to pro-
vide for themselves and their families.
* The author would like to thank Professor Maria Ontiveros, Justin Tiffany, and
Megan Somogyi for their invaluable support in writing this Article. Thank you for listening
to me, for editing this Article, and for helping me believe this was possible. I would also
like to thank my parents, Lewis Hurwitz and Nancy Bloom, for always telling me I had
something to say that was worth listening to.
1. Name and gender have been changed to protect privacy.
2. Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/
pubs/scheduling.html (last visited July 5, 2011).
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In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215, now com-
monly known as the Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”).3 The CUA re-
moved state criminal sanctions for marijuana possession, cultivation,
or use by qualified patients or their caregivers with a doctor’s recom-
mendation.4 California’s CUA has generated a large amount of con-
troversy since its passage fifteen years ago. Among the questions raised
by the CUA is whether the CUA requires employers to make accom-
modations to their drug policies for qualified patient employees that
use medical marijuana off-duty and off-premises. The California State
Supreme Court expressly held in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunica-
tions, Inc. that employers do not have to accommodate such use, even
if the employee’s job performance was in no way impeded by the em-
ployee’s use of medical marijuana.5
Recently, California State Senator Mark Leno (D-San Francisco)
introduced Senate Bill 129 (“S.B. 129”).6 If passed and signed into
law, S.B. 129 would require employers to accommodate off-duty, off-
premises medical marijuana use by qualified patient employees who
do not hold a position implicating public safety.7 S.B. 129 would
change the legal landscape of California in the area of medical mari-
juana regulation by overturning the Ross decision and imposing the
obligation to make accommodations to drug-testing policies for quali-
fied patient employees upon employers. In addition to changing busi-
ness as usual for California employers, the bill also faces the potential
obstacle of preemption by federal drug policy. Congress has the
power to preempt state legislation in a variety of areas, including drug
laws.8
This Comment argues that S.B. 129 should be passed by the Cali-
fornia Legislature and should be signed into law in California. While
S.B. 129 will affect employers in California, the risks to employers and
the public are small, and the benefits to qualified patient employees
are vast. This Comment also explores federal preemption of state
drug policy and argues that S.B. 129, if passed, will not be preempted
by federal law and is strongly supported by public policy.
3. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West
2007), limited on preemption grounds by United States v. Landa, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (N.D.
Cal. 2003).
4. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B).
5. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 206–07 (Cal. 2008).
6. S.B. 129, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (amending the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785, and adding section 11362.787).
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Part I of this Comment explores current California law and exam-
ines the changes that the passage of S.B. 129 will make in the legal
landscape. Part II examines the question of federal preemption and
demonstrates why S.B. 129 would not be preempted by federal drug
policy. Part III examines the public policy reasons supporting the pas-
sage of this bill and demonstrates the benefit the bill will bring to
California.
I. Current California Law and the Likely Effect of the
Passage of S.B. 129
A. The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and the Medical Marijuana
Program Act
On November 5, 1996 California voters approved Proposition
215, which added section 11362.5 to the Health and Safety Code.9
Known as the Compassionate Use Act, this section ensures that “pa-
tients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for
medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not
subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.”10 The term “qualified
caregiver” is defined by the CUA as the person who has consistently
assumed the responsibility to ensure the safety of or to provide hous-
ing or medical care for the qualified patient.11 The CUA was the first
law decriminalizing medical marijuana use by qualified patients in the
United States.12 Since the CUA’s enactment, sixteen states and Wash-
ington D.C. have passed laws legalizing medical marijuana use by qual-
ified patients.13
9. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007).
10. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B).
11. Id. § 11362.5(e).
12. California’s Medical Marijuana Laws, AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, http://www.safeaccess
now.org/article.php?id=5975 (last visited July 5, 2011).
13. Active State Medical Marijuana Programs, NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA
LAWS, http://norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3391 (last visited July 14, 2011); ALASKA
STAT. § 17.37 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801 (West, Westlaw through the First
Regular Session and Third Special Session of the Fiftieth Legislature (2011)); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-106 (2008); D.C. CODE
§ 7-1671.02 (Lexis 2010); S.B. 17, 146th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-
122 (Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2422 (West 2010) (repealed 2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.26421 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-201 (2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 453A (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (Lexis 2010); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4474 (Lexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.040 (2007).
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The CUA was interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Peo-
ple v. Mower14 to grant persons charged with possession of marijuana a
“limited immunity from prosecution . . . allow[ing] a defendant to
raise his or her status as a qualified patient . . . as a defense at
trial, . . .[or] to raise such status by moving to set aside an indict-
ment . . . prior to trial” on the ground of the absence of probable
cause to believe that the medical marijuana user was guilty.15 The
court further held that while the defendant should bear the burden of
proving such a defense, the defendant would only be required to raise
a reasonable doubt as the fact of their immunity, rather than having
to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.16 This holding has
allowed qualified patients to prove their status in court and have the
case against them dismissed, preventing them from being branded
with a drug record. However, qualified patients still faced arrest and
the disruption of going to court as a result of their legal possession or
use of medical marijuana.
In 2003, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill 420
(“S.B. 420”)17 to address these problems. S.B. 420 added article 2.5 to
section 11362.7 of the California Health and Safety Code.18 Section
11362.7, article 2.5, known as the Medical Marijuana Program Act
(“MMP”), established a state mandate requiring the California Depart-
ment of Health Services to create and oversee a voluntary program for
the issuance of identification cards for qualified medical marijuana
patients authorizing them to engage in the medical use of mari-
juana.19 One provision of the MMP imposed on counties an obliga-
tion to “implement a program permitting a limited group of
persons—those who qualify for exemption from California’s statutes
criminalizing certain conduct with respect to marijuana—to apply for
and obtain an identification card verifying their exemption.”20 The
purpose of this requirement was to “facilitate the prompt identifica-
tion of qualified patients and their designated primary caregivers in
14. 49 P.3d 1067 (Cal. 2002).
15. Id. at 1070.
16. Id. at 1071.
17. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 § 2.
18. Medical Marijuana Program Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7–11362.9
(West 2007).
19. Id. § 11362.71(a)(1).
20. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 467 (Ct. App.
2008).
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order to avoid unnecessary arrest and prosecution of these individuals
and provide needed guidance to law enforcement officers.”21
While obtaining an identification card is a voluntary act, partici-
pation in the program provides significant benefits to the patient or
caregiver. Patients who are otherwise in compliance with the CUA and
who carry an identification card are not subject to arrest for violating
California law regarding the transportation, delivery, or cultivation of
marijuana,22 and the program provides law enforcement a twenty-four
hour call center that will verify the validity of the cardholder’s status.23
The identification card also has a picture of the cardholder and iden-
tifying characteristics on the face of the card to allow for ease of iden-
tification and prevention of arrest.24
The MMP sets forth a number of definitions that were absent
from the original text of the CUA, including a definition of what con-
stitutes a “serious medical condition” which would qualify someone to
obtain medical marijuana. In addition to the ten conditions specifi-
cally enumerated (including AIDS, cancers, migraines, and severe
nausea)25 the MMP defines a serious medical condition as:
[A]ny other chronic or persistent medical symptom that either:
Substantially limits the ability of the person to conduct one or
more major life activities as defined in the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, [or which] if not alleviated may cause serious
harm to the patient’s safety or physical or mental health.26
This expansive definition of a qualifying medical condition has al-
lowed many people to obtain a physician recommendation for medi-
cal marijuana. The California Department of Public Health website
states that in the seven years since the implementation of the MMP
identification card program, 55,193 cards have been issued.27 As ob-
taining an identification card is voluntary on the part of the patients,
the total number of medical marijuana users in California is hard to
accurately state, and it is equally impossible to know how many of
these qualified patients have been denied employment due to their
use of medical marijuana. The American Management Association,
21. Id. at 468–69.
22. Medical Marijuana Program Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.71(e) West
2007).
23. Id. § 11362.71(a)(2).
24. Id. § 11362.735(a)(5).
25. Id. § 11362.7 (h)(1)–(11).
26. Id. § 11362.7(h)(12)(A)–(B).
27. Medical Marijuana Program Card Information, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://
www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/Pages/MMPCardDATA.aspx (last visited July 14,
2011).
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however, estimates that seventy-six percent of employers require pre-
employment drug screening, making it likely that many qualified pa-
tients have been discriminated against in the terms and conditions of
employment.28
The MMP states that “[n]othing in this article shall require any
accommodation of any medical use of marijuana on the property or
premises of any place of employment or during the hours of employ-
ment.”29 While it is certainly possible that some employers chose to
accommodate such use, voluntary accommodations were certainly not
the norm. Without clear guidance on the obligations of employers in
the state, the time was ripe for judicial clarification.
B. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications
In Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., the California Su-
preme Court held that employers are not required to accommodate a
qualified employee’s off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana.30
Plaintiff Gary Ross suffered a back injury while serving in the United
States Air Force.31 The injury left Ross suffering muscle spasms and
chronic back pain.32 Due to his condition, Ross was a qualified individ-
ual with a disability under the California Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Act (“FEHA”)33 and received government disability benefits.34
Beginning in September 1999, due to his inability to obtain pain relief
through traditional medications, Ross began using marijuana on his
physician’s recommendation pursuant to the CUA.35
On September 10, 2001, Ross was offered a job by defendant Rag-
ingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (“RagingWire”) as a lead systems
administrator, conditioned on Ross passing a urinalysis drug test.36
Prior to the urinalysis, Ross gave the testing center a copy of his physi-
28. Bob Rosner, Allan Halcrow & Alan Levins, Corner Office: Drug Tests for Employees?,
ABC NEWS (July 16, 2002), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/CornerOffice/story?id=870
50&page=1.
29. Medical Marijuana Program Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a)
(West 2007).
30. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 206–07, 209 (Cal.
2008).
31. Id. at 203.
32. Id.
33. Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12920–12921 (West
1992).
34. Ross, 174 P.3d at 203.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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cians recommendation for marijuana.37 One week later, Ross was in-
formed by the testing center that his sample had tested positive for
tetrahydrocannabinol, the active component of marijuana.38 Ross
gave RagingWire’s human resources director a copy of his physician’s
recommendation for marijuana and explained that he used marijuana
for medical purposes.39 The following day RagingWire’s board of di-
rectors met to discuss the situation and several days later, informed
Ross he was being fired due to his marijuana use.40
Ross filed suit, alleging RagingWire violated the FEHA by termi-
nating him for his disability and by failing to make a reasonable ac-
commodation for his disability.41 Ross further alleged that
RagingWire had wrongfully terminated him in violation of public pol-
icy.42 Ross claimed his disability and use of marijuana did not impede
his performance of the essential functions on the job for which he had
been hired and that he had worked in the same field since he began
using marijuana without any complaints about his job performance.43
The California Supreme Court denied Ross’s claim, finding that the
CUA did not give marijuana the same status as a legal prescription
drug.44 Rather, the court found that “California’s voters merely ex-
empted medical users and their primary caregivers from criminal lia-
bility under two specifically designed statutes.”45 The court also stated
that nothing in the CUA’s text or history “suggests the voters intended
the measure to address the respective rights and obligations of em-
ployers and employees,” but merely to remove criminal sanctions
from the use or possession of marijuana by qualified patients.46
The majority relied heavily on the reasoning of Loder v. City of
Glendale where the court had previously held that employers could
reasonably require prospective employees to be tested for illegal drug
and alcohol use and access the test results.47 The Loder court specifi-
cally stated that employers could condition an offer of employment








44. Id. at 204.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Cal. 1997).
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may reasonably include drug testing.48 In so holding, the court recog-
nized that an employer’s interest in the results of such tests was legiti-
mate “in light of the well-documented problems that are associated
with the abuse of drugs and alcohol by employees.”49 These problems
included absenteeism, unsafe working habits, and high turnover
rate.50
The Ross court rejected Ross’s argument that failure to require
employers to accommodate marijuana use from their drug testing pol-
icies would severely undercut the rights granted to qualified patients
under the CUA.51 The court found that the only right granted by the
CUA was the freedom from state criminal sanctions for possession or
use by qualified patients, stating that “[a]n employer’s refusal to ac-
commodate an employee’s use of marijuana does not affect . . . the
immunity to criminal liability provided in the act.”52 Thus, the rights
granted to qualified patients under the CUA would not be under-
mined by failing to require employers to make this accommodation.
Ross next argued that the MMP required accommodations of off-
duty, off-premises marijuana use because of the language in section
11362.785(a), which states, “[n]othing in this article shall require any
accommodation of any medical use of marijuana on the property or prem-
ises of any place of employment or during the hours of employment.”53 Ross
reasoned that the legislature added this language specifically to imply
that off-site, non-working hours medical marijuana use must be toler-
ated by employers.54 The court rejected this construction, stating that
“[e]ven without inferring a requirement of accommodation, the stat-
ute can be given literal effect as negating any expectation that the
immunity to criminal liability for possessing marijuana granted in the
[CUA] gives medical users a civilly enforceable right to possess the
drug at work.”55 The court refused to agree with Ross that the lan-
guage of the MMP imposed an obligation on employers to accommo-
date qualified patient employees.56
48. Id. at 1211.
49. Id. at 1223.
50. Id.
51. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 205–06.
52. Id. at 206.
53. Medical Marijuana Program Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a)
(West 2007) (emphasis added).
54. Ross, 174 P.3d at 207.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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The court further rejected the amicus brief of five state legislators
who authored the MMP, which stated that the legislators “believed
that this statutory enactment clearly and sufficiently expressed [their]
belief that the FEHA does require employers generally to accommo-
date off-duty, off-premises medical cannabis use by their employee’s,
absent undue hardship.”57 The court found that because the entire
legislature did not share same view as the amici curiae, the court had
no basis for imputing the authors’ views to the entire legislature.58
The court erred in refusing to interpret the MMP as it was au-
thored in the legislature. The specific exemption from protection dur-
ing the hours of employment and on the work site clearly imply that
an employer would be required to accommodate medical marijuana
use off-duty and while away from the place of employment. The court
also rejected Ross’s contention that he had been terminated in viola-
tion of public policy, finding that the CUA did not indicate any inten-
tion to articulate fundamental public policy concerning marijuana use
in an employment context or requiring employers to accommodate
marijuana use by their employees.59 Without the implication of a fun-
damental public policy and because the CUA did not provide notice
to employers that this type of termination would violate public policy,
Ross’s claim of a termination in violation of public policy failed.
Under the majority holding, RagingWire’s discrimination against Ross
became the accepted rule in California.
Justice Kennard authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in
RagingWire. While she agreed with the majority that Ross’s claim of
termination in violation of public policy must fail, she nevertheless
found that the FEHA would have prevented Ross’s termination.60 Jus-
tice Kennard stated that she would have held:
Unless an employer can demonstrate that an employee’s doctor-
approved use of marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act while
off-duty and away from the jobsite is likely to impair the employer’s
business operations in some way . . . the employer’s discharge of
the employee is disability discrimination prohibited by the state
Fair Employment and Housing Act.61
Justice Kennard argued that the majority’s holding defeated the
central purpose of the CUA—to allow the medically prescribed use of
57. Brief of Amici Curiae of California Legislators in Support of Petitioner at 2, Ross,
174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008) (No. S138130).
58. Ross, 174 P.3d at 208.
59. See id. at 205–06.
60. Id. at 209–10 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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marijuana without fear of sanctions—and found that the majority’s
interpretation imposed a “cruel choice” on seriously ill Californians—
“continue receiving the benefits of marijuana use . . . and become
unemployed, . . . or continue in their employment . . . and try to
endure their chronic pain or other condition for which marijuana
may provide the only relief.”62 In this statement Justice Kennard
summed up the difficult decision faced by Ross, Jane Smith, and other
qualified patients in California.
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority’s view that accepting
the off-duty, off-premises use of marijuana by an employee was not a
reasonable accommodation required by the FEHA because marijuana
remains illegal under federal drug policy.63 In finding that there was
no support for this position, she argued that “determining whether an
employee-proposed accommodation is reasonable requires considera-
tion of its benefits to the employee . . . , the burdens it would impose
on the employer and other employees, and the availability of suitable
and effective alternative forms of accommodation.”64 Rejecting the
consideration of federal law in determining the reasonableness of a
proposed accommodation, Justice Kennard stated the reasonableness
determination turns on how it would affect RagingWire’s legitimate
interests as an employer, and more specifically, whether it would im-
pose an “undue hardship”—defined as “an action requiring signifi-
cant difficulty or expense”65—on the operations of RagingWire’s
business. Her construction would require RagingWire to demonstrate
that Ross’s off-duty, off-premises use of marijuana would adversely im-
pact its business operations. Justice Kennard also demonstrated that
the majority’s reliance on federal drug policy to reject Ross’s accom-
modation request was misguided in this case. The majority should
have conducted the traditional balancing of interests test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of Ross’s request and any potential burden
on the employer.66 Under this framework Ross should have been
granted an accommodation.67
62. Id. at 211.
63. Id. at 212.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 213.
66. See id. at 209–10 (reasoning that under FEHA “determining whether an employee-
proposed accommodation is reasonable requires consideration of its benefits to the em-
ployee . . . , the burdens it would impose on the employer and other employees, and the
availability of suitable and effective alternative forms of accommodation”).
67. Id. at 213.
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In its defense, RagingWire cited the California Drug-Free Work-
place Act of 199068 which requires employers receiving government
contracts or subsidies to certify that they provide “a site . . . at which
employees of the entity are prohibited from engaging in the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, possession or use of a con-
trolled substance.”69 RagingWire argued that under the authority of
the California Act and the substantially similar authority of the federal
Drug-Free Workplace Act,70 accommodating Ross’s off-duty use of ma-
rijuana could negatively implicate its ability to gain state agency con-
tracts or federal grants.71 Justice Kennard roundly rejected
RagingWire’s argument, finding:
The drug-free workplace laws are not concerned with employee’s
possession or use of drugs like marijuana away from the jobsite,
and nothing in those laws would prevent an employer that know-
ingly accepted an employee’s use of marijuana as a medical treat-
ment at the employee’s home from obtaining drug-free workplace
certification.72
Finding there to be no evidence supporting the claim that Ross’s doc-
tor-recommended use of marijuana would necessarily or likely have
substantial adverse effects on RagingWire’s business operations, Jus-
tice Kennard found Ross’s complaint to state a cause of action under
the FEHA for failure of the employer to make a reasonable accommo-
dation to existing employment policies.73 Without a compelling rea-
son why the accommodation could not be made, Ross’s
accommodation request should have been granted.
Justice Kennard also rejected the majority’s reliance on the Loder
decision, as the policy at issue in Loder was testing for the presence of
drugs “for which the applicant [had] no legitimate medical explana-
tion.”74 Justice Kennard found that because Ross’s use was legal and
medically explained, there was no risk of the abuses and adverse job
performance concerns that were at issue in Loder, where the plaintiff
had no medical explanation for his drug use. Justice Kennard stated
that the FEHA requires an employer to accommodate the use of a
wide variety of drugs that can impair job performance, including
Vicoden, Ritalin, OxyContin, and Valium, and so Justice Kennard had
68. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8350–8357 (West 2005).
69. Id. § 8351(a).
70. Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701 (2006), amended by Act of Jan. 4,
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, 124 Stat. 3677, 3827–28.
71. Ross, 174 P.3d at 213 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Cal. 1997)).
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no difficulty in determining that the FEHA would also require the
accommodation of off-site, off-premises medical marijuana use.75 Be-
cause the risks associated with illegal drug use in the workplace are
not attributed to over-the-counter or prescription medications, Justice
Kennard found that the risks should not be attributed to medical ma-
rijuana because it qualifies as a prescription medication in California.
The holding of the majority in Ross allowed employers to discrim-
inate against qualified patients who would not choose to forego medi-
cal marijuana use. Justice Kennard was correct in her dissenting
opinion that the voters of California could not have thought they were
decriminalizing medical marijuana use while still allowing users to be
punished in the workplace. The majority opinion in this case was in
error and requires legislative correction. In immediate response to
the Ross decision, Senator Mark Leno authored a bill in 2008 to pro-
hibit discrimination against qualified patient employees. A.B. 2279,
substantially similar to the current S.B. 129, passed both houses but
was vetoed by then-Governor Schwarzenegger.76 Senator Leno has re-
cently sought to re-introduce legislation to end workplace discrimina-
tion towards qualified patient employees and to overturn the Ross
decision.
C. The Proposed S.B. 129
On January 27, 2011 Senator Leno introduced S.B. 129.77 If
passed, S.B. 129 would amend section 11362.785 and add section
11362.787 to the California Health and Safety Code to “declare it un-
lawful for an employer to discriminate against a person in hiring, ter-
mination, or any term or condition of employment or otherwise
penalize a person, if the discrimination is based upon the person’s
status as a qualified patient or a positive drug test for marijuana.”78
The bill further provides a civil cause of action to any person who has
suffered such discrimination and provides for remedies of damages,
injunctive relief, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any other
equitable relief the court deems proper.79 The bill does not grant a
blanket right to use marijuana to all workers all the time. It specifically
does not prohibit an employer from “terminating the employment of,
75. Id. at 214–15.
76. Office of Senate Floor Analyses, Cal. State Senate, Third Reading of S.B. 129 at 4,
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_129_cfa_
20110411_105426_sen_floor.html.
77. S.B. 129, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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or taking other corrective action against an employee who is impaired
on the property or premises of the place of employment, or during
the hours of employment, because of the medical use of marijuana.”80
This provision protects the legitimate interests of employers of ensur-
ing their workforce is able to perform their essential job functions. It
also provides a way for an employer to take corrective action against
an employee exploiting the privilege of medical marijuana by being
inebriated at work while still safeguarding the choices of qualified pa-
tient employees.
S.B 129 also exempts from its coverage persons who work in
“safety-sensitive” positions.81 The bill defines such a position as “[a]
position in which medical cannabis-affected performance could
clearly endanger the health and safety of others.”82 The bill outlines
three factors which must be present to define a safety-sensitive
position:
(A) Its duties involve a greater than normal level of trust, responsi-
bility for, or impact on the health and safety of others
(B) Error in judgment, inattentiveness, or diminished coordina-
tion, dexterity, or composure while performing its duties could
clearly result in mistakes which would endanger the health and
safety of others
(C) An employee in a position of this nature works independently,
or performs tasks of a nature that it cannot safely be assumed that
mistakes like those described in subparagraph (B) could be pre-
vented by a supervisor or other employee.83
The exemption extends to any position involving the performance of
a “safety-sensitive function” as described by section 655.4 of title 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations84 (“C.F.R.”) and to persons holding
positions in law enforcement, as defined by section 13951 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code.85
Section 655.4 of the C.F.R. applies to any person employed by a
grant recipient, sub-recipient, or contractor whose duties are enumer-
ated in the statute.86 Such duties include carrying a firearm for secur-
ity purposes, operating a revenue service vehicle, operating a
nonrevenue service vehicle when such operation requires a Commer-





84. 49 C.F.R. § 655.4 (2010).
85. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13951(d) (West 2005).
86. 49 C.F.R. § 655.3.
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hicles, or maintaining or repairing a revenue service vehicle of
equipment used in revenue service.87 Section 13951 of the California
Government Code defines “law enforcement” to mean:
[E]very district attorney, municipal police department, sheriff’s de-
partment, district attorney’s office, county probation department
and social services agency, the Department of Justice, the Depart-
ment of Corrections, the Department of Youth Authority, the De-
partment of the California Highway Patrol, the police department
of any campus of the University of California, California State Uni-
versity, or community college, and ever agency of the State of Cali-
fornia expressly authorized by statute to investigate or prosecute
law violators.88
Those exempted from coverage by S.B. 129 include bus drivers, pilots,
police officers, paramedics, fire fighters, and security guards.89 These
restrictions on the application of S.B. 129 are reasonable and serve to
demonstrate the lack of impact the passage of S.B. 129 will have on
employers or the public safety. Any employer who can show that their
employees fall into the category of workers with “safety sensitive” func-
tions will not need to comply with the provisions of S.B. 129, meaning
that public safety would not be implicated by the amendment.
These restrictions do deprive a certain subset of qualified patients
the same rights as other qualified patients. However, the exempted
employees have jobs that could implicate the public safety in a serious
way. It is not unreasonable to expect a higher level of responsibility
from an ambulance driver than the level of responsibility expected
from a person who operates a cash register. One of them will have to
make split second decisions concerning another person’s life in the
course of performing their job, while the other will not. Studies have
shown that in some people the effects of marijuana can take days or,
in very extreme cases, weeks to subside.90 An employee whose job re-
quires decisions and actions taken to protect public safety should not
be able to use a product at home which could be a danger to the
public the next day. Arguments could certainly be made that such em-
ployees are allowed to take Benadryl or other over-the-counter medi-
cations, which could negatively impact their thinking at work, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The changes to the legal landscape in California if S.B. 129 is
signed into law would be very small, as would the practical effects on
87. Id. § 655.4.
88. GOV’T § 13951(d).
89. S.B. 129, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
90. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NIDA INFOFACTS: MARIJUANA, http://www.drug
abuse.gov/PDF/InfoFacts/Marijuana.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
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most employers. Overturning the Ross decision means employers
could not fire or refuse to hire someone who tested positive for mari-
juana if that person had a valid physician’s recommendation. How-
ever, as clearly delineated in S.B. 129, employers would also not be
forced to accommodate employees under the influence of marijuana
at work.91 As Justice Kennard pointed out in her dissenting opinion,
employers would not face decertification under California’s Drug Free
Workplace Act, since the act only prohibits employers from tolerating
use or possession of drugs in the workplace and during working
hours.92
Overturning the Ross decision through S.B. 129 would not im-
pose too heavy of a burden on California employers, but it would sig-
nificantly improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of qualified
patients. Despite the benefits of S.B. 129, a second potential obstacle
for the full implementation of S.B. 129 is the possible preemption by
federal law.
II. Potential Federal Preemption Problems
A. Definitions and Examples of Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the
Constitution and federal laws made in pursuance of the Constitution
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”93 It is well established that
Congress has the power to preempt state law through the Supremacy
Clause and that state laws which conflict with federal laws are without
effect and void. Courts have traditionally used the Supremacy Clause
to ensure the uniform application of federal law and policy in the face
of conflicting state policies.94 The clause has been called “the most
important guarantor of national union. It assures that the Constitu-
tion and federal laws and treaties take precedence over state law and
binds all judges to adhere to that principle in their courts.”95
In County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML96 the California Court
of Appeal for the Fourth District considered the question of federal
preemption of the implementation of the MMP identification card
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a) (West 2007).
92. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 213 (Cal. 2008)
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
94. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–53 (2001).
95. Constitution of the United States, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/civics/consti-
tution_item/constitution.htm#a6 (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
96. 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct. App. 2008).
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system. The County of San Diego argued that issuance of the identifi-
cation cards was preempted by the Controlled Substances Act97
(“CSA”).98 In considering the preemption question, the court dis-
cussed the traditional framework for examining conflicts between
state and federal law.99 Starting with the statement that the “purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis”100 the
NORML court cited the California Supreme Court as having identified
the
[F]our species of federal preemption: express, conflict, obstacle,
and field. First, express preemption arises when Congress “de-
fine[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state
law.” . . . Second, conflict preemption will be found when simulta-
neous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossi-
ble. Third, obstacle preemption arises when “‘under the
circumstances of [a] particular case [the challenged state law]
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Finally, field preemp-
tion, i.e., “Congress’ intent to preempt all state law in a particular
area,” applies “where the scheme of federal regulation is suffi-
ciently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”101
Courts determining the possible preemption of a state law look
specifically to the intent of Congress in enacting the federal scheme to
determine which species of preemption, if any, will apply. There is
also, however, a traditional presumption against preemption in the
courts and generally otherwise valid state laws will only be found to be
preempted when a federal statute specifically states that it displaces
any attempt by states to legislate in a particular area.102 This presump-
tion against preemption is especially strong when “Congress legislates
in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.”103
97. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801–971 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011).
98. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 467 (Ct. App.
2008).
99. Id. at 475–78.
100. Id. at 475.
101. Id. at 475–76 (citations omitted) (quoting Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas
Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569 (Cal. 2007)).
102. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996).
103. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 478–79.
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B. Federal Laws Which May Preempt S.B. 129
1. The Controlled Substances Act
The 1937 Marihuana Tax Act104 (“MTA”) was the first significant
federal regulation of marijuana. While the MTA did not outlaw mari-
juana per se, it imposed registration and reporting requirements on
every person who imported, produced, sold, or dealt in marijuana,
imposed an annual marijuana tax, and imposed a transfer tax to be
levied every time marijuana changed hands.105 Noncompliance with
the tax scheme resulted in the imposition of severe federal penalties,
and failure to comply with the reporting and administrative require-
ments could result in prosecution under state drug laws.106 In 1970
Congress consolidated the drug laws and enhanced federal drug en-
forcement by enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. Title II of the Act is the CSA.107 The CSA repealed
most of the earlier drug laws and established a regulatory system mak-
ing it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any
controlled substance, except as otherwise authorized by the CSA.108
The CSA states that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance
was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order,
from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional prac-
tice.”109 The exception regarding a doctor’s prescription or order
does not apply to any controlled substance that has been classified as a
Schedule I narcotic,110 including marijuana.111 Schedule I narcotics
are classified as such due to their “high potential for abuse,”112 the
lack of “accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,”113
and the lack of acceptable safety protocols for using the drug, even
under medical supervision.114 Under federal law, possession of mari-
juana for personal use is punishable by up to one year in prison,115
104. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551, repealed by Controlled Substances Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242.
105. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6, 14–16 (1969)).
106. Id. (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 19 (1969)).
107. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801–971 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011).
108. Id. § 841(a)(1).
109. Id. § 844(a).
110. Raich, 545 U.S. at 14.
111. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), sched. I, at (c)(10) (2006).
112. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A).
113. Id. § 812(b)(1)(B).
114. Id. § 812(b)(1)(C).
115. Id. § 844(a).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN107.txt unknown Seq: 18 21-OCT-11 11:15
266 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
and the statutory scheme of the CSA has been interpreted to reflect
congressional intent to restrict marijuana use to limited research
settings.
In its interpretation of the CSA, the Supreme Court has noted
that, “[b]y classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as opposed to
listing it on a lessor schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or posses-
sion of marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole exception
being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration
preapproved research study.”116 Regardless of the actions of the states,
marijuana remains illegal under federal law, and efforts to remove its
classification as a Schedule I narcotic have been completely unsuccess-
ful.117 However, the provisions of the CSA have been carefully spliced
by courts to determine the extent of preemption on the issue of drug
policy, especially in light of the traditional assumption against pre-
emption in legislation impeding on areas of states’ historic police
powers, criminal sanctions for drug offenses, and medical care.
In San Diego v. San Diego NORML, the court cited the party’s stipu-
lation and wide jurisdictional agreement that the CSA contains an
anti-preemption clause in section 903, acknowledging:
Congress’ statement in the CSA that “[n]o provision of this sub-
chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of
the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on
the same subject matter” demonstrates Congress intended to reject
express and field preemption of state laws concerning controlled
substances.118
The wide acceptance of section 903 of the CSA as an anti-preemp-
tion clause lends support to the idea that states have an amount of
discretion in enacting medical marijuana policies. The rejection of ex-
press and field preemption means S.B. 129 will only be preempted by
the CSA if compliance with both the CSA and S.B. 129 is impossible
(conflict preemption), or if S.B. 129 poses an obstacle to the full
objectives and purposes of the CSA (obstacle preemption). S.B. 129
could also be blocked from full implementation by the Drug-Free
Workplace Act.
116. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005).
117. See John Hoeffel, U.S. Decrees That Marijuana Has No Accepted Medical Use, L.A.
TIMES.COM (July 9, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-marijuana-20110709,
0,1346255.story.
118. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 476 (Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted).
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2. The Federal Drug-Free Workplace Act
The Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988119 (“DFWA”) requires indi-
viduals and organizations that receive federal grants or obtain federal
contracts to certify that they provide a drug-free workplace by “notify-
ing employees that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, . . . posses-
sion, or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the [grantee’s
or contractor’s] workplace.”120 The DFWA defines a drug-free work-
place as “an entity at which employees of such entity are prohibited
from engaging in the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensa-
tion, possession, or use of a controlled substance.”121 The repercus-
sions for violation of the DFWA is the suspension of payment, the
termination of the contract or grant, and the disbarment of the con-
tractor’s or grantee’s eligibility for participation in the contracting or
grant process in the future.122 Violations of the DFWA will be found
where a contractor or grantee made a false certification of compli-
ance, where they have violated any of the requirements of the
DFWA,123 or where so many of the contractor or grantee’s employees
have been convicted of drug law violations that there is a strong indi-
cation “that the contractor has failed to make a good faith effort to
provide a drug-free workplace as required.”124 The DFWA does not
contain a preemption clause; therefore the only ways an employer
complying with S.B. 129 could be found to be in violation of the
DFWA is by falsely certifying compliance or through a conflict arising
from simultaneous compliance with S.B. 129 and the DFWA, which
would prevent an employer from accommodating a qualified patient
employee’s off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana and ob-
taining certification under the DFWA.
In order to make a prediction of the likely outcome of a preemp-
tion challenge to S.B. 129 under state and federal law, it will be help-
ful to examine two prior preemption determinations of California’s
medical marijuana laws and how judges have interpreted the legality
of California’s medical marijuana system. Then, a conclusion may be
drawn regarding the possible preemption of S.B. 129 by either the
CSA or the DFWA.
119. Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701–07 (2006).
120. Id. § 702(a)(1)(A).
121. Id. § 706(1).
122. Id. § 702(b)(1).
123. Id. § 702(b)(1)A).
124. Id. § 702(b)(1)(B).
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a. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML
The County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML court held that the
identification card requirement imposed on California counties by
the MMP was not preempted by the CSA.125 In addressing conflict
preemption, the court relied heavily on Gonzales v. Oregon126 where
the U.S. Supreme Court held the CSA’s preemption clause demon-
strated Congress “explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regu-
lating controlled substances.”127 The NORML court took specific
notice of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Gonzales, in which he argued that
section 903 of the CSA was inapplicable to the majority opinion be-
cause section 903 only preempted state laws that affirmatively man-
dated conduct that violated federal law.128 As the MMP did not
require the counties to do anything other than issue identification
cards, which is not in itself conduct that violates federal law, the MMP
was not rendered void through conflict preemption.129 Working from
the assumption the states had a contemplated role in the shaping of
their particular drug policies, the NORML court determined it was
possible to be fully in compliance with both laws at the same time,
negating any conflict preemption.130
In addressing obstacle preemption, the NORML court looked to
congressional intent when enacting the CSA.131 As the MMP and the
CSA regulate an area traditionally occupied by state regulation, medi-
cal practices and state sanctions for drug possession, the court relied
on the presumption that “[w]hen Congress legislates in a ‘field which
the states have traditionally occupied[,] . . . we start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’”132 The court found that because the anti-pre-
emption clause of section 903 expressly limits preemption to “only
those state laws in which there is a positive conflict between [the federal
and state law] so that the two cannot consistently stand together,”133 Con-
gress only intended to preempt state laws that could not be followed
125. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 484 (Ct. App.
2008).
126. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
127. Id. at 251.
128. Id. at 289–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 481.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 477–78.
132. Id. at 478 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
133. Id. at 479.
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without violating federal law and did not intend to “supplant all laws
posing some conceivable obstacle to the purposes of the CSA.”134 The
court stated that because “section 903 preserves state laws except
where there exists such a positive conflict that the two laws cannot con-
sistently stand together, the implied conflict analysis of obstacle pre-
emption appears beyond the intended scope of . . . section 903.”135
The court further held that even if obstacle preemption was implied
by the statute, the MMP did not pose a significant obstacle to the
CSA.136 The CSA’s purpose is to combat recreational drug use, not to
regulate the state’s medical practices. Since the MMP sought only to
streamline the identification process of exempted patients, the MMP
did not present a substantial obstacle to the purposes of the CSA.137
Even if Congress had intended to preempt state laws that presented a
significant challenge to the purposes of the CSA, the mild require-
ments imposed by the MMP would not violate it.
In the most recent Supreme Court case on the subject of medical
marijuana, Gonzales v. Raich,138 the Court found that Congress could
preempt state medical marijuana laws but did not extend their hold-
ing to say the CSA did in fact preempt California medical marijuana
laws.
b. Gonzales v. Raich
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed Congress’ power to regulate
intrastate marijuana cultivation and use under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution in Raich. The Court stated the CSA was “a valid
exercise of federal power” and that “Congress’s power to regulate in-
terstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of
those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed
locally.”139 The Court did not specifically hold state medical mari-
juana laws would be preempted by the CSA, merely that Congress has
the power to regulate such activities.
The plaintiffs, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, were California
residents and qualified patients under the CUA.140 On August 15,
2002, county deputy sheriffs and federal Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration agents went to Monson’s home where she cultivated marijuana
134. Id.
135. Id. at 479–80.
136. Id. at 481.
137. Id. at 483.
138. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id. at 6.
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for her own medical use.141 The county deputies concluded after an
investigation that Monson’s use of the marijuana was entirely lawful as
a matter of California law; however, the federal agents seized and de-
stroyed her six marijuana plants.142 Raich and Monson brought suit,
claiming that CSA’s “categorical prohibition on the manufacture and
possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California
law exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.”143
The Raich Court specifically relied upon Congress’ power to regu-
late purely local activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce.144 The Court noted “Congress can
regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that
it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that
class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market
in that commodity.”145 The Court then applied this reasoning and
stated that as the primary purpose of the CSA was to control the sup-
ply and demand of controlled substances in both legal and illegal
drug markets, the Court had no trouble concluding that “Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed mari-
juana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market
conditions.”146 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens,
found that even the local, non-commercial cultivation of marijuana
was an activity that was “quintessentially economic.”147 As an eco-
nomic activity, it is well within the proper scope of congressional regu-
lation.148 The majority rejected Raich’s and Monson’s argument that
marijuana possession and cultivation in accordance with state law was
beyond the reach of the federal government’s regulation and prohibi-
tion.149 The Court cited the Supremacy Clause and stated “[i]t is be-
yond peradventure that federal power over commerce is “‘superior to
that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their in-
habitants,’” however legitimate or dire those necessities may be.”150
The Court did not specifically rule on the preemption of the CUA by
141. Id. at 7.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 15.
144. Id. at 17 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)).
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 25.
148. See id. at 25–26.
149. See id. at 23–26.
150. Id. at 29 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
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the CSA since Monson and Raich only argued the CSA was unconstitu-
tional due to its regulation being beyond the reach of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority.151 The majority simply stated that Con-
gress was able to regulate the cultivation of marijuana through the
Commerce Clause, and, as such, there was no constitutional violation
in the application of the CSA to Monson and Raich.152
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice O’Connor stated she felt the
majority overlooked the role of states as laboratories, stating “[o]ne of
federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”153 Justice
O’Connor expressed disapproval of the majority decision which:
[S]anctions an application of the federal Controlled Substances
Act that extinguishes that experiment, without any proof that the
personal cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for medical
purposes, if economic activity in the first place, has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce and is therefore an appropriate sub-
ject of federal regulation.154
Justice O’Connor emphasized the distinction between recreational
and medical use of marijuana and added the CSA even contains a
medical necessity exception,155 though not one that applies to Sched-
ule I narcotics.156 She recognized the specific conduct at issue in the
case was the “personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes” as legalized by the state of California.157 Jus-
tice O’Connor then concluded that homegrown cultivation and per-
sonal possession of marijuana has no commercial character and has
not been shown to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.158
She further claimed that the CSA is too vague and general to show the
federal regulatory scheme for recreational drug use will be under-
mined if the CSA is not applied to qualified patients like Raich and
Monson.159 Justice O’Connor correctly found that the means of regu-
lation and application of the CSA to qualified patients was too attenu-
151. See id. at 8.
152. Id. at 22, 25–26.
153. Id. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
154. Id. at 43.
155. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)(b) (2006); but see id. §§ 812(2)(b), 812(3)(b).
156. Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 48, 50.
159. Id. at 55.
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ated from the ends to be achieved—disrupting the market for illicit
drugs—to stand.160
It is beyond dispute that Congress may regulate the field of medi-
cal marijuana in an attempt to stem the illegal drug trade. However,
this does not mean that S.B. 129 will be preempted. As the Court did
not reach that question, there is no bright line rule. It is still open to
conjecture whether just because the federal government can preempt
a state medical marijuana law, it will.
C. Specific Preemption of S.B. 129
1. The Controlled Substances Act
Full implementation of S.B. 129 will not be barred by the CSA. As
the NORML court determined, the anti-preemption clause in section
903 of the CSA specifically contemplates a role for the states in defin-
ing their drug policy, and S.B. 129 does not run into problems of con-
flict or obstacle preemption as defined by the NORML court.161 S.B.
129 does not conflict with the CSA because S.B. 129 does not mandate
any behavior that would violate the CSA, nor is simultaneous compli-
ance with both laws impossible. The duty of employers to accommo-
date the off-duty, off-premises use of medical marijuana by qualified-
patient employees that would be imposed by S.B. 129 is not addressed
by the CSA, clearly leaving room for state legislation and not posing a
conflict to the full implementation of S.B. 129. Without specific and
unavoidable conflict between the two laws, S.B. 129 does not run afoul
of conflict preemption.
S.B. 129 does not pose an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the CSA, therefore S.B. 129 will not run into problems of
conflict preemption. The CSA is intended to prevent recreational
drug use, and marijuana use pursuant to a physician recommendation
is not recreational drug use.162 Requiring employers to accommodate
such medicinal use would not frustrate the attempt to prevent recrea-
tional drug use, as S.B. 129 only requires accommodation of medical,
not recreational, marijuana use. The Raich majority did state a central
purpose of the CSA was to control the supply and demand of the ille-
gal drug trade, and so Congress was able to regulate medical mari-
juana users to serve this purpose.163 This implies that any state’s
160. Id. at 56–57.
161. County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 478–82 (Ct. App.
2008).
162. Id. at 470.
163. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
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medical marijuana laws that increase the supply or demand for con-
trolled substances would be subject to obstacle preemption by the
CSA. Requiring employers to accommodate qualified patient-employ-
ees’ off-site and off-hours use of medical marijuana does not increase
the supply or demand for illegal marijuana, as medical marijuana can
only be obtained from registered dispensaries. S.B. 129 does not in-
centivize participation in a medical marijuana program in a way that
would abet the illegal drug trade. Since S.B. 129 simply disallows work-
place discrimination against qualified patient-employees, it is highly
unlikely S.B. 129 will be found to be preempted by the CSA.
2. The Drug-Free Workplace Act
For many of the same reasons, S.B. 129 will not bring employers
into conflict with the Drug-Free Workplace Act. As Justice Kennard
aptly stated in her opinion in Ross v. RagingWire, the DFWA only
speaks to use or possession in the workplace and is silent on the matter
of employees’ off-site use of drugs.164 This reasonably implies employ-
ers could be lawfully required to accommodate such use without com-
ing into open conflict with the DFWA scheme. If courts follow Justice
Kennard’s reasoning on this literal interpretation of the meaning of
the DFWA, S.B. 129 poses no problem or conflict with federal policy.
S.B. 129 specifically does not require employers to tolerate drug use in
the workplace nor does it allow employees to be incapacitated at work
due to off-site drug use.165 This construction means that employers
will be able to comply with the DFWA by certifying that they do not
allow the use, possession, manufacture, or distribution of illegal drugs
in their workplaces while still accommodating use by qualified patient
employees.
Additionally, the purpose behind the DFWA is to prevent the pro-
vision of federal money to contractors and grantees who tolerate ille-
gal drug use, possession, or distribution by their employees at the
worksite.166 S.B. 129 does not frustrate the purpose of the DFWA. S.B.
129 specifically states, “[n]othing in this article shall require any ac-
commodation of any medical use of marijuana on the property or
premises of any place of employment or during the hours of employ-
ment.”167 Because employers will not be required to tolerate such con-
164. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 213 (Cal. 2008).
165. S.B. 129, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
166. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 213 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
167. S.B. 129, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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duct in their worksites, they will not be forced to engage in conduct
which frustrates the purpose of the DFWA schemes.
D. Additional Support for the Argument that S.B. 129 will not be
Preempted
The preemption of S.B. 129 also seems unlikely considering the
lack of challenges to other states’ medical marijuana laws and the sys-
temic refusal of the federal government to use its preemption power
to prevent the implementation of other California state medical mari-
juana laws.
1. Rhode Island as a Test Case
Rhode Island currently has a law in place that prohibits discrimi-
nation in employment, housing, or education due a person’s status as
a qualified patient or their use of medical marijuana.168 The Edward
O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act states, “[n]o
school, employer or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ or lease to
or otherwise penalize a person solely for his or her status as a [medical
marijuana patient].”169 Since its passage five years ago, the law’s pro-
scription of adverse employment action against qualified patient em-
ployees has not been contested in a single reported case.170 While it is
impossible to accurately predict the possible impact of a proposed law,
it seems reasonable to argue that if employers were finding it impossi-
ble to comply with both state and federal law, a suit would have been
filed to enjoin the application of the Rhode Island law to a given em-
ployer. The lack of litigation in Rhode Island supports the argument
that employers have not found simultaneous compliance impossible
and have not been overly burdened in accommodating medical mari-
juana users. As that has not happened, a reasonable inference may be
drawn that the law has not caused this problem. There is therefore
little reason to think that California’s law, which proscribes the same
conduct, would impose a heavy and unworkable burden on employers
and lead to a preemption challenge.
168. Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 21-28.6-4 (Lexis 2010).
169. Id.
170. Id.; see Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Rhode
Island’s statute as an example of one among ten states that have passed decriminalizing
use, possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana for the seriously ill); State v.
Berringer, 229 P.3d 615, 621 n.3 (Or. 2010) (citing Rhode Island’s statute as an example
that Rhode Island specifically extends protections to patients who obtain registry identifica-
tion cards or other functionally equivalent authority for their states).
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2. Refusal of the Department of Justice to Prosecute Patients
Complying with State Law
On October 19, 2009, the Attorney General’s Office released a
memorandum for selected United States Attorneys detailing the ad-
ministration’s system of investigating and prosecuting medical mari-
juana users.171 The memo offers guidance and states that so long as
people are in compliance with state medical marijuana laws, they will
not be the subject of federal prosecution.172 The memo makes clear
that the disruption of the illegal drug trade remains the highest prior-
ity of the Department of Justice but that “pursuit of [those] priorities
should not focus federal resources . . . on individuals whose actions
are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws pro-
viding for the medical use of marijuana.”173 The memo is clear that
nothing in the guidance will prevent the investigation and prosecu-
tion of individuals who use the medical marijuana laws as a pretext for
unauthorized cultivation, possession, or sale of marijuana.174 The De-
partment also retains the right to initiate investigation and prosecu-
tion “even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state law, in particular circumstances where investigation or
prosecution otherwise serves important federal interests.”175
This memo supports the idea that state medical marijuana laws
are not automatically preempted by the CSA. It is unlikely that the
Justice Department would give discretion to U.S. Attorneys in deter-
mining whether to prosecute medical marijuana patients if the state
laws were in direct conflict with federal policy. This in turn supports
the argument that states have discretion in setting their own drug poli-
cies. It further suggests that if S.B. 129 is passed, the federal govern-
ment will not have any interest in prosecuting employers who are
complying with the state requirements of non-discrimination against
medical marijuana users for abetting a violation of the CSA. Without
the fear of federal prosecution for conduct mandated by state law,
employers will be able to make the accommodations required by S.B.
129 without fearing federal liability for compliance with state law.
171. Memorandum from General David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, on Inves-
tigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana, to United
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3. Veterans Health Administration Changes Medical Marijuana
Policy
On July 10, 2010, the Veterans Health Administration (“VHA”)
issued a similar memo providing guidance to VHA medical facilities
with patients who use medical marijuana legally under state law.176
Prior to this directive, veterans who tested positive for marijuana use
risked the loss of their VHA benefits, including the loss of prescription
pain medication, regardless of their status as a qualified patient under
state law.177 The directive states that “patients participating in state
medical marijuana programs must not be denied VHA services,”178 al-
though it does caution that doctors made aware of treating patients
using medical marijuana may want to change treatment options.
While VHA doctors are not allowed to prescribe marijuana to patients
and VHA pharmacies will not fill such prescriptions,179 this is a large
step forward in recognizing the need for policy changes which do not
force patients to choose between receiving medical care they are enti-
tled to due to their veteran status because of their choice to use medi-
cal marijuana.
It is especially striking that this directive comes from the federal
VHA. The federal government’s willingness to allow persons receiving
federal benefits to use medical marijuana in compliance with state law
suggests that the government will not have a strong interest in prose-
cuting the employers who employ these patients. The VHA’s willing-
ness to embrace non-traditional medical treatments and allow
veterans to participate in medical marijuana programs under state law
may signal a shift in federal policy towards medical marijuana laws,
which will prevent any preemption of S.B. 129.
E. Conclusions on the Possible Preemption of S.B. 129
S.B. 129 will not be preempted by federal law. As discussed above,
employers will not be forced to decide between compliance with the
state law and compliance with the CSA or the federal DFWA, meaning
that conflict preemption will not prevent the full implementation of
176. See Veterans Health Administration Directive 2010-035, Medical Marijuana (2010)
[hereinafter VHA Directive, Medical Marijuana], available at http://www.vawatchdog.org/
10/nf10/nfjul10/jul10files/medicalmarijuanadirectiveVA.pdf.
177. Dan Frosch, V.A. Easing Rules for Users of Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/health/policy/24veterans.
html?pagewanted=all.
178. VHA Directive, Medical Marijuana, supra note 176.
179. Frosch, supra note 177.
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S.B. 129 if it is signed into law. Neither does S.B. 129 pose an obstacle
to the achievement of the full purpose of the CSA or the DFWA, as it
does not increase the illicit drug trade, and it does not impose a re-
quirement on employers to tolerate drug use in the workplace. In ad-
dition, the systematic refusal of the federal government to prosecute
medical marijuana users acting in compliance with state law leads to
the reasonable conclusion that employers will not face federal sanc-
tions for complying with the requirements of S.B. 129. This lack of
conflict with federal law and the disinterest of the federal government
in prosecuting such cases clearly show that if S.B. 129 is signed into
law, employers will have no reason not to comply with it.
III. Public Policy Supporting the Passage of S.B. 129
Public policy strongly favors the implementation of S.B. 129.
First, as Justice O’Connor stated in her dissent to the Raich decision,
one of the advantages of the federalist system is to allow the voters of a
state to enact policies and act as laboratories for the rest of the coun-
try.180 Novel ideas can be experimented with by the states without risk-
ing the integrity of the federal system. If an experiment does not
succeed, only a single state will bear the consequences, not the entire
nation. If an experiment succeeds, it can serve as a model for similar
policies to take place at the federal level and affect the entire nation.
Without the ability of states to act in this capacity, new and interesting
ideas may never be tried, and the legal landscape of the nation could
stagnate for fear of the possible effects of a given change.
S.B. 129, in conjunction with the Rhode Island law, could act to
inform national policy on the need to prevent discrimination against
users of medical marijuana in the workplace. Passage of S.B. 129 could
also lend support to the idea that medical marijuana use could be
legalized nationally by showing the types of regulatory actions to pre-
vent abuse of such a system. Without the ability to try novel experi-
ments such as medical marijuana schemes, the purpose of federalism
and states’ rights is undermined.
Federalism as a justification for S.B. 129 is further supported by
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Raich.181 Justice Thomas articulated the
traditional authority of the states to regulate the health, safety, and
morality of its citizens and to enforce criminal sanctions within its bor-
ders, and he asserted that the application of the CSA in that case tram-
180. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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pled on these traditional powers.182 This supports the proposition that
states may use their traditional police powers to set policies that com-
ply with the wishes of that state’s citizens.
S.B. 129 regulates medical decisions made by the citizens of Cali-
fornia, delineates the criminal sanctions, or lack thereof for such use,
and sets standards for employers operating in the state. All of these
regulations fall firmly within the traditional police powers of the state
and provide an interesting experiment with the potential to shape na-
tional policy in the future. Without the bulwark of the courts standing
against imposition by federal regulations, the roles of the states in
forming policy is diminished, and one of the true strengths of the
federalist system is lost.
S.B. 129 also supports patient privacy and the right to make medi-
cal decisions consistent with a person’s autonomy over his or her own
body. It would prohibit the type of adverse employment actions that
can make qualified patients choose between their preferred method
of symptom care and their jobs, a decision that is cruel to impose
upon people suffering from illness and disease. Disallowing workplace
discrimination against qualified patients is also well within the spirit of
the CUA. California voters approved the CUA to allow qualified pa-
tients to use marijuana to alleviate the symptoms of their medical con-
ditions. In so doing, it is unreasonable to assume, as the majority in
the Ross court did, that the voters wanted to remove criminal sanctions
from medical marijuana use but had no problem allowing those same
patients to be sanctioned in the workplace through discrimination for
their medical marijuana use. The signing of S.B. 129 into law would
allow the purposes of the CUA to be fully realized by allowing quali-
fied persons with medical conditions to use medical marijuana with-
out fear of any repercussions for that choice.
On a more pragmatic note, S.B. 129 also fulfills the public policy
goal of ensuring that as many Californians as possible can obtain gain-
ful employment. By allowing discriminatory practices against qualified
patients to continue, the state of California is preventing capable
adults from entering the workforce. This not only prevents the state
from collecting income tax from those persons, it prevents them from
spending money in the economy and potentially thrusts the burden of
their care on the state and the taxpayers. By signing S.B. 129 into law,
the state of California will be removing a roadblock to employment
182. Id. at 66.
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for qualified patients, an act that benefits the patients and the state of
California.
Conclusion
Jane Smith is still searching for employment. Her medical deci-
sions concerning her medical marijuana use continue to be the larg-
est barrier to finding a job. At the time of this Comment she has
decided that she must forego her chosen pain management in order
to increase her chances of finding a job and to end the consistent
questioning she undergoes during interviews. Her frustration at hav-
ing her private medical decisions forming the basis for decisions not
to hire her have convinced her that, for the time being at least, she
cannot have both a job and medical autonomy. This decision is diffi-
cult and she fears the mental and physical symptoms of her PTSD will
return when she stops using marijuana completely. However, her
greater fear is her continuing inability to provide for herself and her
family. This decision plagues thousands of Californians just like Jane
and is one that no one should be forced to make. Without the passage
of S.B. 129 and the resulting decision by the California Legislature to
end workplace discrimination against qualified medical marijuana pa-
tients, the choice between legal medical treatment and gainful em-
ployment will continue to be one that singles out medical marijuana
patients and foists a choice on them that, as Justice Kennard stated in
the Ross decision, is a cruel one that California voters could not have
intended when they passed the CUA.183
In the sixteen years since the passage of the CUA, California has
struggled to define the parameters of acceptable medical marijuana
use and possession. Part of this struggle has been the identification of
the obligations of non-marijuana users to qualified patients. By sign-
ing S.B. 129 into law, the California State Legislature would be provid-
ing a great deal of clarification on this point and would be making a
decision consistent with federal law and the best interests of the quali-
fied patient population of the state. As has been demonstrated in this
Comment, passage of the bill will not overly burden California em-
ployers through changes to the law and will not place them in conflict
with federal regulations. S.B. 129 will not face a successful preemption
challenge, and the federal government has given no indication of an
interest in prosecuting employers for compliance with this new law.
183. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 212 (Cal. 2008)
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Public policy strongly supports the implementation of S.B. 129, and
the benefit it would bestow on qualified patients is vast. As there is no
reason to prevent its full implementation, S.B. 129 should be passed
and signed into law in the state of California.
